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Introduction
Stephen Field, a New York lawyer, traveled to California to join the
Gold Rush, ended up serving as alcalde (mayor) of a local town, and soon
developed a reputation for procedural fairness.1 He became involved in
state-level politics, eventually rising to Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court and also serving as a federal circuit court judge.2 In time,
Field was selected by President Lincoln to serve as the newly created tenth
justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 3
For immigration scholars, Justice Field is perhaps best remembered for
his majority opinion in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 4 the Supreme
Court’s decision upholding Chinese exclusion, and credited for introducing
the plenary power doctrine to immigration law. Yet, despite the opinion’s
xenophobic rhetoric reflecting his personal views of the Chinese, Justice

* Maureen B. Cavanaugh Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Associate Dean of
Academic Affairs, and Professor of Law, Penn State. I would like to thank my friend and
colleague Michael Scaperlanda for his kind invitation to participate in this important event
and the Oklahoma Law Review editors for their good work on this piece. All errors that
remain are mine alone. Thanks also to Dean Jim Houck for his support of this and all my
work. Finally, special thanks to Corie, Ryan, Julia, and Matthew for reminding me about
what is most important in life.
1. See generally PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE
GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE (1997). For an account of Field’s California days in his own
words, see STEPHEN J. FIELD, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF EARLY DAYS IN CALIFORNIA (Da
Capo Press 1968) (first privately printed in 1893).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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Field dissented in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 5 reasoning that, once
they became lawful residents, the Chinese were entitled to be treated as
equals under the law regardless of citizenship, 6 a position supported by his
earlier federal circuit court opinion in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan. 7
Regardless of one’s particular views of his opinions in these cases, it
appears Field sought to balance his unfavorable personal and political views
about mass Chinese immigration against his duty as a federal judge to
uphold the constitutional rights of individual persons within the United
States, regardless of their race and citizenship, before Congress’s plenary
power. This tension between viewing immigrants as an undifferentiated
mass and recognizing each immigrant as a person worthy of constitutional
protection pervades contemporary debates regarding immigration today. 8
Further, research in social psychology suggests that, within immigration
policy, seldom will personhood trump membership as an organizing
principle when benefitting noncitizen outsiders is perceived to come at the
expense of U.S. citizen insiders.9 Put another way, immigration law
presumes differences among citizens and noncitizens and creates others
among noncitizens; thus, while it is already difficult to extend the circle of
empathy beyond family and friends to strangers, it is particularly difficult to
do so within a field like immigration law, which is designed to maintain
boundaries between citizen and “alien.” Nonetheless, recognizing and
working within these constraints, immigrant rights advocates would do well
to emphasize and guard against our inherent parochialism, as Field
appeared to do in Fong notwithstanding his opinion in Chae.
I. Field’s Views on Exclusion and Racial Division in Chae
Most students of immigration law remember Chae Chan Ping v. United
States for the proposition that Congress has plenary power to exclude
noncitizens—including returning residents—for any reason, including

5. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
6. Id. at 753-56.
7. 12 F. Cas. 252, 255-57 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
8. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Portrait of the Undocumented Immigrant: A
Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 159-60 (2009) (arguing that one’s perception of proper
immigration policy depends in part on whether one views migrants as individuals needing
help or as a mass of undifferentiated, undocumented persons who are inherently
lawbreakers).
9. See infra Part III.
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race. 10 Laborer Chae Chan Ping was a twelve-year resident of Chinese
descent who had secured a certificate of return from federal authorities
prior to leaving the United States.11 When he returned, however, Chae Chan
Ping’s certificate was revoked pursuant to the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882, which had since been passed. 12 Justice Field’s majority opinion for
the Court emphasized Congress’s prerogative to withdraw permission to
enter as part of a larger policy of exclusion by race, and that returning
residents like the plaintiff must turn to their home nation—and not the
Court—for redress. 13
One aspect of the opinion that often draws criticism from modern
commentators is Justice Field’s xenophobic, anti-Chinese rhetoric. Field
was writing at a time when the previously valued Chinese workers had
outlived their usefulness in the eyes of some, especially Californians who
saw them as threats to white laborers and/or Anglo-Saxon culture. 14
Although acknowledging the workers’ industry and frugality, 15 Field noted
that differences in race exacerbated tensions between the natives and
newcomers, describing the Chinese as “strangers in the land, residing apart
by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own
country.” 16 Field thought these cultural differences insurmountable: “It
seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any
change in their habits or modes of living.” 17 In describing California’s
reaction to the Chinese, Field insisted “their immigration was in numbers
approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to our
civilization.” 18
Although one might frame Field’s unfortunate word choice as reflecting
California’s—not the Justice’s—views, an April 1882 letter to law
10. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of
Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck, eds.,
2005).
11. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 581-82.
14. Historian Paul Kens, who wrote a 1997 biography of Field, acknowledges the antiChinese racism rampant at the time, but also noted the perception that the Chinese laborers’
willingness to work long hours for little pay undermined the advances white workers had
struggled to achieve. See KENS, supra note 1, at 133.
15. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 585 (“[The Chinese workers] were generally
industrious and frugal.”).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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professor John Norton Pomeroy belies that perspective. In the letter
expressing his disappointment with then-President Arthur’s veto 19 of the
first version of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Field makes clear that his
immigration policy would reserve the United States for Caucasians only:
It must be apparent to every one, that it would be better for both
races to live apart—and that their only intercourse should be that
of foreign commerce. The manners, habits, mode of living, and
everything connected with the Chinese prevent the possibility of
their ever assimilating with our people. They are a different
race, and, even if they could assimilate, assimilation would not
be desirable. If they are permitted to come here, there will be at
all times conflicts arising out of the antagonism of the races
which would only tend to disturb public order and mar the
progress of the country. It would be better, therefore, before any
larger number should come, that the immigration be stopped.
You know I belong to the class, who repudiate the doctrine that
this country was made for the people of all races. On the
contrary, I think it is for our race—the Caucasian race. We are
obliged to take care of the Africans; because we find them here,
and they were brought here against their will by our fathers.
Otherwise, it would be a very serious question, whether their
introduction should be permitted or encouraged.20
It appears, then, that the rhetoric—though perhaps not as offensive then
as it is today—reflected not just California’s views on the Chinese, but
Justice Field’s as well. Given his long sojourn in California before joining
the Court, it is no surprise that his negative views about the Chinese may
have been influenced in part by his time in that state.
II. Field’s Views on Deportation and Equality in Fong
And yet, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, while the majority inferred
Congress’s power to deport from its Chae power to exclude, Justice Field
saw a “wide and essential difference” 21 between the two:

19. H.R. Res. 282, 4, 112th Cong. (2011). In President Arthur’s view, the initial version
violated the terms and spirit of the Angell Treaty with China. Id.
20. Four Letters of Mr. Justice Field, 47 YALE L.J. 1100, 1104 (Howard J. Graham, ed.,
1938).
21. 149 U.S. 698, 746 (1893).
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The power of the government to exclude foreigners from this
country,-that is, to prevent them from entering it,-whenever the
public interests, in its judgment require such exclusion, has been
repeatedly asserted by the legislative and executive departments
of our government, and never denied; but its power to deport
from the country persons lawfully domiciled therein by its
consent, and engaged in the ordinary pursuits of life, has never
been asserted by the legislative or executive departments except
for crime, or as an act of war in view of existing or anticipated
hostilities, unless the alien act of June 25, 1798 can be
considered as recognizing that doctrine.22
For Field, noncitizen residents had never been removable at Congress’s
whim; indeed, only criminal and enemy noncitizens could be deported.
Noncitizens that already enjoy resident status and are “engaged in the
ordinary pursuits of life” 23 were not to be arbitrarily removed.
Field’s approach seems similar to modern heightened rational basis 24
review of amendments to the Chinese Exclusion Act, which required
Chinese laborers to apply for a certificate of residence. 25 Failure to do so
made each Chinese worker presumptively deportable, unless he could prove
“by at least one credible white witness, that he was a resident of the United
States at the time of the passage of [the] act.” 26 Although Field deemed
constitutional Congress’s desire to distinguish between those lawfully and
unlawfully present, he questioned the means by which this objective was to
be achieved. 27
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Gerald Gunther coined the phrase “rational basis with bite” to describe this quasiheightened form of rational basis scrutiny where the Court overturns legislation despite
claiming to apply a deferential standard of review. See generally Gerald Gunther, Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1972). For an illuminating discussion on the
different formulations of the rational basis test, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 694-96 (4th ed. 2011).
25. Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), OUR DOCUMENTS, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/
doc.php?doc=47 (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).
26. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 727 (quoting the Chinese Deportation Act of May 6,
1892, § 6).
27. Id. at 753-54 (Field, J., dissenting). “This object being constitutional, the only
question for our consideration is the lawfulness of the procedure provided for its
accomplishment, and this must be tested by the provisions of the constitution and laws
intended for the protection of all persons against encroachment upon their rights.” Id.
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Field’s primary objections to the statute proceeded in three steps: (1)
noncitizen residents are entitled to the same constitutional protections as
U.S. citizens; (2) because of the hardship exile wrought upon deportees,
removal without due process constitutes an arbitrary exercise of
congressional power; and (3) the procedures set forth in the statute—
including the white witness requirement—do not provide due process and
are therefore unconstitutional. Let us consider each argument in turn.
First, Field believed that all lawful residents of the United States,
regardless of citizenship, are entitled to constitutional protection: “Aliens
from countries at peace with us, domiciled within our country by its
consent, are entitled to all the guaranties for the protection of their persons
and property which are secured to native-born citizens.” 28 Unlike the
majority, which saw exclusion and deportation as two sides of the same
coin of sovereign political power, Field believed that it was the judiciary’s
duty to ensure that all lawful residents received constitutional protection
from “[a]rbitrary and despotic power.” 29 In support, Field cited two
California cases involving anti-Chinese discrimination, Yick Wo v. Hopkins
and Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan. 30
In Yick Wo, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a race-neutral San
Francisco laundry ordinance that was almost exclusively enforced against
Chinese residents, noting that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees are
“universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws.” 31 Awarding habeas corpus to the Chinese petitioners
prosecuted under the San Francisco ordinance, the Court reasoned that such
selective prosecution could only be explained by “hostility to the race and
nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law,
is not justified.” 32
In Ho Ah Kow, then-federal circuit judge Field invalidated a state prison
ordinance requiring all men to sport short hair, which led to the shearing of
Chinese “queues,” the braids some wore for spiritual reasons.33 Declaring

28. Id. at 754.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 755 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 336 (1886); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,
12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C. D. Cal. 1879)).
31. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
32. Id. at 374.
33. Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 253, 256-57.
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the provision “hostile and spiteful,” 34 Field was troubled by the state’s
encroachment on federal treaty power and its failure to afford state
residents equal protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
source of constitutional protection at issue in Yick Wo. 35 Field articulated
the following vision for equal protection:
[T]he equality of protection thus assured to every one whilst
within the United States, from whatever country he may have
come, or of whatever race or color he may be, implies not only
that the courts of the country shall be open to him on the same
terms as to all others for the security of his person or property,
the prevention or redress of wrongs and the enforcement of
contracts; but that no charges or burdens shall be laid upon him
which are not equally borne by others, and that in the
administration of criminal justice he shall suffer for his offenses
no greater or different punishment. 36
Although Yick Wo and Ho Ah Kow articulated a robust “personhood”
theory grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s textual commitment of
equality for all “persons,” not just citizens,37 both cases involved
discrimination by a state —California—not by the federal government. 38
Nonetheless, the Fifth Amendment’s text, while without similar equal
protection language, guarantees due process as against the federal
government, a point which fellow Fong dissenter Chief Justice Fuller noted
in citing Yick Wo. 39
34. Id. at 256.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 256.
37. See, e.g., VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 162 (2005) [hereinafter ROMERO, ALIENATED] (distinguishing
between personhood and membership theories). See generally Michael Scaperlanda, Partial
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996) (same).
38. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356 (1886); Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 253.
39. Fuller stated:
I entertain no doubt that the provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which forbid that any person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, are in the language of Mr. Justice
Matthews, already quoted by my Brother Brewer, ‘universal in their application
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality,’ and although in Yick Wo’s case
[118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064] only the validity of a municipal
ordinance was involved, the rule laid down as much applies to Congress, under
the Fifth Amendment, as to the States, under the Fourteenth. The right to
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Just as his California experiences may have influenced his personal
views on the Chinese as expressed in Chae, his role as a federal judge
ruling on California’s anti-Chinese statutes may have informed Justice
Field’s judicial opinion in Fong, this time to the noncitizens’ benefit. For
instance, it is noteworthy that Field specifically cited his own federal circuit
court opinion in Ho Ah Kow. 40 While the two other dissenting justices cited
Yick Wo, 41 neither cited Field’s opinion in Ho Ah Kow. In citing to Ho Ah
Kow, Field defined equal protection thusly:
What once I had occasion to say of the protection afforded by
our government, I repeat: “It is certainly something in which a
citizen of the United States may feel a generous pride that the
government of his country extends protection to all persons
within its jurisdiction, and that every blow aimed at any of them,
however humble, come from what quarter it may, is ‘caugnt [sic]
upon the broad shield of our blessed constitution and our equal
laws.’” 42
Curiously, in Fong, Field did not cite to an earlier case in which he ruled
against the California commissioner of immigration, who had attempted to
bar certain Chinese women from entry because they were prostitutes. In In
re Ah Fong, Field recognized that discrimination against Chinese
prostitutes, while promoting an arguably legitimate goal, both infringed
upon federal treaty power and was excessively underinclusive by not
targeting all prostitution. 43 Field articulated the following equality
remain in the United States, in the enjoyment of all the rights, privileges,
immunities, and exemptions accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most
favored nation, is a valuable right, and certainly a right which cannot be taken
away without taking away the liberty of its possessor. This cannot be done by
mere legislation.
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 761-62 (1892) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). It
was not until 1954 that a majority of the Court read the guarantees of equal protection into
the Fifth Amendment’s due process in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion
case to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 754-55.
41. See id. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 762 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 755 (internal citation omitted).
43. Field stated:
I am aware of the very general feeling prevailing in this state against the
Chinese, and in opposition to the extension of any encouragement to their
immigration hither. It is felt that the dissimilarity in physical characteristics, in
language, in manners, religion and habits, will always prevent any possible
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principle: “equality of protection implies not only equal accessibility to the
courts for the prevention or redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of
rights, but equal exemption with others of the same class from all charges
and burdens of every kind.” 44
Aside from his citation of Yick Wo, Justice Field’s own opinion in Ho Ah
Kow—and perhaps in Ah Fong—appeared to influence his view that
noncitizen residents were to be treated as persons under the Constitution,
regardless of their citizenship, irrespective of his Chae opinion’s
implications to the contrary. According to Field, noncitizen residents like
Fong Yue Ting enjoy protections that entering noncitizens like Chae Chan
Ping do not.
Second, Field believed that because of the hardship exile wrought upon
deportees, removal without due process constituted an arbitrary exercise of
congressional power. The forced exile of a lawful resident noncitizen was a
disproportionately cruel punishment, in Field’s eyes: “As to its cruelty,
nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one’s
residence, and the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family, and
business there contracted.” 45 As such, Field objected to the majority’s view
that these residents might be removed administratively, “without judicial
trial or examination.” 46 Carried this far, such power would be tantamount
to Congress’s arbitrary authority over lawful resident noncitizens:
According to its theory, Congress might have ordered executive
officers to take the Chinese laborers to the ocean and put them
assimilation of them with our people. Admitting that there is ground for this
feeling, it does not justify any legislation for their exclusion, which might not
be adopted against the inhabitants of the most favored nations of the Caucasian
race, and of Christian faith. If their further immigration is to be stopped,
recourse must be had to the federal government, where the whole power over
this subject lies. The state cannot exclude them arbitrarily, nor accomplish the
same end by attributing to them a possible violation of its municipal laws. It is
certainly desirable that all lewdness, especially when it takes the form of
prostitution, should be suppressed, and that the most stringent measures to
accomplish that end should be adopted. But I have little respect for that
discriminating virtue which is shocked when a frail child of China is landed on
our shores, and yet allows the bedizened and painted harlot of other countries to
parade our streets and open her hells in broad day, without molestation and
without censure.
In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 217 (C.C. D. Cal. 1874).
44. Id. at 218.
45. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 759.
46. Id. at 755.
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into a boat and set them adrift; or to take them to the borders of
Mexico and turn them loose there; and in both cases without any
means of support. . . . 47
Finally, Field believed that the procedures set forth in the statute—
including the white-witness requirement—did not provide due process and
were therefore unconstitutional. For instance, Field worried that abuse of
the Chinese may lead to abuse of white noncitizens over time. Field wrote,
Is it possible that Congress can, at its pleasure, in disregard of
the guarantees of the Constitution, expel at any time the Irish,
German, French, and English who may have taken up their
residence here on the invitation of the government, while we are
at peace with the countries from which they came, simply on the
ground that they have not been naturalized?48
Field held particular contempt for the white-witness requirement:
Here the government undertakes to exact of the party arrested
the testimony of a witness of a particular color, though
conclusive and incontestible testimony from others may be
adduced. The law might as well have said, that unless the laborer
should also present a particular person as a witness, who could
not be produced, from sickness, absence, or other cause, such as
the archbishop of the state, to establish the fact of residence, he
should be held to be unlawfully within the United States. 49
Despite his personal distaste for Chinese immigration, Field acknowledged
that one’s race did not determine one’s veracity.
A critic might contend the distinctions Field drew were neither consistent
with the facts in Chae and Fong, nor respectful of either legislative
expertise over immigration or state interests in regulating immigration.
First, one might be unconvinced by the exclusion and deportation
distinctions Field drew because Chae Chan Ping was a twelve-year lawful
resident of the U.S. prior to his journey abroad, 50 not unlike resident Fong
Yue Ting. 51 Moreover, he legally sought to protect his interests by securing
a certificate to return.52 While being at the border is different from being
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 756.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 759-60.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 581-82 (1889).
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731-32.
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
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within it, does this otherwise reasonable legal fiction53 make sense within
the facts of the Chae case? Of course, one might respond that eroding the
differences between exclusion and deportation may, instead of extending
protection to returning residents like Chae Chan Ping, lead to the
diminishment of protection for current residents reflected in the majority
opinion in Fong. Put differently, abandoning the distinction between
exclusion and deportation may advance immigrant rights via robust judicial
review or it may lead to virtually no judicial review, as the majority held in
Chae and Fong.
How one chooses between the three options—(1) robust plenary power
over immigration (Chae and Fong); (2) judicial review of deportations but
not exclusions, even of returning residents (Field’s view); or (3) robust
judicial review of immigration decisions—depends on the extent to which
one believes that deportation is a form of punishment. Viewing deportation
as simply holding noncitizens to the terms of their immigration contract,54
the majority’s perspective in Chae and Fong does nothing more than return
noncitizens to their home countries. Indeed, outside the forced migration
context, some might contend that it borders on arrogance to assume that a
native of another country might refuse to live in her own nation. Further,
such a perspective assumes that, irrespective of the harm or potential harm
to the immigrant, the receiving nation has a sovereign right to secure its
borders and protect its own citizens.
The opposite of this view is the third one: that a forced return violates
free movement and choice, and, in the context of current (like Fong Yue
Ting) or returning residents (like Chae Chan Ping), separates them from
relationships made and property acquired while in the United States.
Indeed, one of the touchstones of our modern immigration law is family
unity, exemplified by the citizen’s privilege of petitioning for her partner to
enter the country as an immigrant.55 As Justice Brandeis famously noted,
deportation may deprive a person of “all that makes life worth living.” 56
53. For an interesting discussion of arguably troublesome legal fictions in immigration
law, see Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegal Uses of Legal Fiction in
Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51 (1989).
54. See, e.g., Won Kidane, Immigration Law as Contract Law, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
889 (2011) (reviewing VICTOR C. ROMERO, EVERYDAY LAW FOR IMMIGRANTS (2009)).
55. In immigration parlance, such spouses are “immediate relatives” not subject to
quota. See Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). President
Obama’s recent executive action deferring the deportation of qualifying undocumented
parents of U.S. citizen children has a similar goal of keeping families together. See, e.g.,
Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last visited Apr. 5, 2015) (“On November 20,
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In choosing option two, Field split the difference, arguing in his Fong
dissent that deportation is more punitive than exclusion. 57 Factually, this
cannot always be true—as the Chae facts imply—but it was reasonable for
Field and his co-dissenters to assume that longtime residents would have
established greater ties with the United States than first-time entrants.
Analogously, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, former Chief Justice
Rehnquist implied that noncitizens could not avail themselves of protection
against government searches and seizures unless they could demonstrate
their “voluntary connection” with the United States.58
Further implicated in this choice among the three options is the proper
role of the judiciary vis-à-vis the political branches of the federal
government.
Under this horizontal separation of powers analysis,
advocates of the broad plenary power afforded Congress in Chae and Fong
might contend that immigration policy can only reasonably be handled by
an elected, deliberative, legislative entity. To have the judiciary secondguess the contours of the nation’s contract with noncitizens would violate
the limited role unelected federal judges should play under the Constitution.
On the other hand, because individuals are ultimately affected by any policy
Congress adopts, the judiciary should be wary of legislative overreaching
where the consequences are grave for actual residents.59
A third issue underlying this discussion is finding the appropriate
balance between federal and state power over immigration. As has always
been true, states and local communities bear the biggest burdens of mass

2014, the President announced a series of executive actions to crack down on illegal
immigration at the border, prioritize deporting felons not families, and require certain
undocumented immigrants to pass a criminal background check and pay taxes in order to
temporarily stay in the U.S. without fear of deportation.”) (emphasis added); Linda Hartke,
President Obama’s Executive Action Puts Families First, REDEFINING WELCOME BLOG
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://blog.lirs.org/president-obamas-executive-action-puts-families-first/.
56. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
57. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 748-50, 758-60 (1892).
58. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990). For a more
detailed exploration of Verdugo, see ROMERO, ALIENATED, supra note 37, ch. 4.
59. Scholars have long debated the virtues and vices of Congress’s plenary power over
immigration. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination
and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, passim (1998); Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, passim (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Essay, Ten
More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 925, passim (1995); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of
Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, passim.
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immigration. 60 Some today would argue that states like California should
play a more active role in regulating immigration, as it crudely tried to do in
Ah Fong, by barring Chinese prostitutes from entry into the state. 61 In our
federal system, high-volume receiving states should be able to regulate the
influx of noncitizens into the state, so the argument goes. In Arizona v.
United States, for instance, Justice Scalia recently stressed the impact of
undocumented migration on the border state of Arizona:
As is often the case, discussion of the dry legalities that are the
proper object of our attention suppresses the very human realities
that gave rise to the suit. Arizona bears the brunt of the country’s
illegal immigration problem. Its citizens feel themselves under
siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants who invade their
property, strain their social services, and even place their lives in
jeopardy. Federal officials have been unable to remedy the
problem, and indeed have recently shown that they are unwilling
to do so. Thousands of Arizona’s estimated 400,000 illegal
immigrants—including not just children but men and women
under 30—are now assured immunity from enforcement, and
will be able to compete openly with Arizona citizens for
employment. 62
Yet, as Justice Field recognized in Ho Ah Kow and In re Ah Fong, states
may sometimes violate the due process and equal protection rights of
noncitizens lawfully resident in their midst.63 Because the Fourteenth
Amendment textually protects all persons and not just citizens, Field was
wary of not just federal government abuse in Fong Yue Ting, but indeed, his
60. Gerald Neuman reminds us how, prior to 1875, immigration policy was largely the
province of the several states before becoming predominantly a national affair. Gerald
Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833, 1834 (1993) (“Regulation of transborder movement of persons existed, primarily at
the state level, but also supplemented by federal legislation.”). In A Localist Reading of
Local Immigration Regulations, Rick Su challenges the conventional notion that municipal
regulations affecting immigrants should be viewed exclusively through the prism of
federalism or federal supremacy. Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration
Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008). Instead, Su suggests that they be viewed as
emanating from more mundane local concerns including “kinship and community interests,
the standing of newcomers versus old timers, [and] the decision of who bears the tax burden
for local services” that have little to do with immigration. Id. at 1621.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
62. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 256-57 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879); In re Ah Fong, 1
F. Cas. 213, 216 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874).
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concern for the constitutional rights of Chinese residents grew from
witnessing their unfair treatment during his time in California. 64
In the end, Justice Field secured half a victory for his vision of
constitutional immigration law. In Chae, he wrote the majority opinion
establishing sweeping power for Congress to enact exclusion rules free
from judicial review, even those based on the race of returning noncitizens.
Yet in Fong, Field failed to persuade a majority of the Court that lawful
Chinese residents deserved constitutional protection from the plenary power
unleashed in Chae; instead, the Fong Court extended Chae’s reach to
curtail deportees’ ability to seek judicial review. 65
While one might justify both Chae and Fong on the (horizontal, and
implicitly, vertical) separation of powers grounds previously discussed,
modern readers might nonetheless be troubled by the implication that race
may reasonably provide the basis for exclusion or deportation, as Congress
wills. In our post Brown v. Board of Education society, few would support
the idea that government should be able to remove noncitizens simply
because of their race. Indeed, notwithstanding his ruling in Chae, Justice
Field was apparently so upset about the result in Fong that he seriously
contemplated a court-packing plan to reverse the outcome:
It might be possible to increase the size of the bench, he confided
to Dickinson. “As a general rule it would be dangerous to
increase the size of the bench for the purpose of correcting a bad
decision,” he admitted, “but where that decision goes to the very
essentials of Constitutional Government, the question of an
increase of the bench may be considered and acted upon.” 66
In a nutshell, we see Justice Field seeking to create a balance between
respecting national sovereignty for U.S. citizens’ benefit and ensuring that
noncitizens are treated fairly pursuant to constitutional mandates. Taken
together, Field’s Chae and Fong opinions suggest a territorially bound view
of the Constitution—that is, that the Constitution’s equality provisions have
greatest force when applied to lawful U.S. residents, regardless of
citizenship.
Having explored the legal reasons supporting and detracting from Field’s
approach, the next section turns to psychology to better understand the third
way advocated by Field. As discussed below, we learn that empathy for
others is difficult to generate and sustain, making it particularly vexing for
64. See supra text accompanying notes 27-44.
65. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 741-44 (1893).
66. KENS, supra note 1, at 284 (citations omitted).
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immigrant advocates in a legal field designed to draw distinctions between
insider-citizens and outsider-immigrants.
III. Empathy and Its Limits: Field’s Views, the Modern Immigration
Debate, and Social Psychology
Justice Field’s struggle with trying to find a third way between complete
congressional power over immigration and mandatory judicial review over
migrants’ claims seems to reflect the similarly bimodal current public
opinion over immigration issues. For instance, the racial makeup of
Americans polled seems to affect their view of whether increasing the
number of deportations of the undocumented is good or bad policy. A 2014
Pew Research Center report revealed that “60% to 35%, most Hispanics
view the increased number of deportations negatively, while whites are
more likely to see this trend as a good thing (49%) rather than bad
(42%).” 67
While it might be tempting to attribute such differences in perspective to
(c)overt racism, social psychology suggests several other explanations that
go to the empathic limits humans have for the outgroup. Unlike other
studies that focus on the subtle 68 or not-so-subtle 69 ways in which
67. Pew Res. Center for the People & the Press, Public Divided Over Increased
Deportation of Unauthorized Migrants, PEW RES. CENTER (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.
people-press.org/2014/02/27/public-divided-over-increased-deportation-of-unauthorizedimmigrants/. Even among Republicans, victors during the recent midterm elections,
sentiment over the plight of the undocumented is mixed. See Trip Gabriel, Republican
Voters Want to Get Things Done, but Differ on Priorities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2014, at P7
(New York ed.), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/us/politics/republicanvoters-want-to-get-things-done-but-differ-on-priorities.html?_r=0 (“Immigration reform was
also on voters’ minds, though there was disagreement over whether to deport workers who
are in the country illegally or offer them a path to legal status. Geography seemed to
influence views.”). Interestingly, while the public seems focused primarily on Latin
American migration, today’s Chinese restaurant workers appear to be the current incarnation
of “coolie” laborers like Chae and Fong. See, e.g., Lauren Hilgers, The Kitchen Network:
America’s Underground Chinese Restaurant Workers, NEW YORKER, Oct. 13, 2014, http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/cooka%C2%80%C2%99s-tale?intcid=modmost-popular.
68. See, e.g., IAN HANEY-LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS
HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2014) (noting that coded
racial appeals have served as a proverbial “dog-whistle” to help perpetuate structural
racism).
69. See, e.g., EDIBERTO ROMÁN, THOSE DAMNED IMMIGRANTS: AMERICA’S HYSTERIA
OVER UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION (2013) (a socio-legal response to critics of contemporary
Hispanic migration); LEO R. CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS,
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outgroups are demonized by in-groups, this section will focus on research
that suggests human beings are limited in their ability to empathize. In the
modern immigration context, this means there are limits to U.S. citizens’
empathy for noncitizens, especially if noncitizens are viewed en masse
rather than as individuals.
Psychologist Jonathan Baron describes “parochialism” as the “tendency
of people to favor a group that includes them while underweighing or
ignoring harm to outsiders.” 70 Specifically, Baron notes that parochialism
manifests in a failure to help rather than an active desire to harm. 71 This
“omission bias” 72 does vary considerably from person to person, however,
and so Baron notes that the proper framing of issues may help to trigger
empathy:
The distinction between groups and individuals examined here is
almost a “framing effect,” an effect of two different ways of
describing the same situation. When we harm groups, we harm
the individuals who comprise those groups, yet many people are
less willing to harm the individuals than to harm the groups. It
should not be difficult to find political opponents of more lenient
treatment of illegal immigrants who, at the same time, respect
and help particular illegal immigrants whom they know.
Arguments against parochialism, in addition to emphasizing the
equivalent effects of acts and omissions, should also emphasize
the humanity of out-group members. 73
Reducing parochialism by pointing out omission biases and individual
(as opposed to group) effects may explain, for example, Good Samaritan
laws, but may be more difficult to lead to sweeping reform within
immigration law, a system specifically premised on distinctions between
citizens and noncitizens. Indeed, “system justification theory” teaches there
CITIZENS, AND THE NATION (2008) (a sociological study of the media-driven xenophobia
underlying the resistance to current Latino migration).
70. Jonathan Baron, Parochialism as a Result of Cognitive Biases, in UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 203, 203 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks &
Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012). Lu-in Wang has observed a similar phenomenon in her
important book, Discrimination by Default. See LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT:
HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 8-16, 18-23 (2006) (noting that discrimination is more the
process of default actions that perpetuate the status quo racial order rather than the product
of overt bias and prejudice).
71. Baron, supra note 70, at 235.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 236.
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is a “general tendency to defend, legitimize, and bolster the social and
political systems on which people are psychologically dependent.” 74 Thus,
even the most ardent of immigrant rights advocates still tend to operate
under a respect for sovereign borders, even while clamoring for greater
protections for noncitizens.
And to the extent that the public views the immigration problem as
overwhelmingly complex and dire, attempts at eliciting empathy toward
legal change may be difficult. In revealing research done on moral attitudes
toward genocide, psychologists Paul Slovic and David Zionts argue that
numbers often overwhelm us:
One fundamental mechanism that may play a role in many, if
not all, episodes of mass-murder neglect involves the capacity to
experience affect, the positive and negative feelings that combine
with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and
actions. Research shows that the statistics of mass murder or
genocide, no matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the
true meaning of such atrocities. The numbers fail to spark
emotion or feeling and thus fail to motivate action. Genocide in
Darfur is real, but we do not “feel” that reality. 75
Slovic and Zionts affirm the intuition that, even in the face of horrible
brutality, our capacity to empathize falls short:
Fundamental qualities of human behavior are, of course,
recognized by others besides scientists. American writer Annie
Dillard cleverly demonstrates the limitation of our affective
system as she seeks to help us understand the humanity of the
Chinese nation: “There are 1,198,500,000 people alive now in
China. To get a feel for what this means, simply take yourself—
in all your singularity, importance, complexity, and love—and
multiply by 1,198,500,000. See? Nothing to it.”
We quickly recognize that Dillard is joking when she asserts
“nothing to it.” We know, as she does, that we are incapable of

74. SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION 8
(John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay & Hulda Thorisdottir eds., 2009).
75. Paul Slovic & David Zionts, Can International Law Stop Genocide When Our
Moral Intuitions Fail Us?, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 70, at 100, 101.
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feeling the humanity behind the number 1,198,500,000. The
circuitry in our brain is not up to this task. 76
This example may help us understand the holdings in Chae and Fong
from a psychological perspective. If the Chinese are viewed en masse as
outsiders, foreign subjects less worthy of empathy than insider U.S.
citizens, then the opinions become less about overt racism than about the
human tendency to draw lines separating the familiar from the unfamiliar.
To accommodate a large, undifferentiated mass of people strains the limits
of our human capacity to empathize.
Slovic and Zionts posit an evolutionary reason for our limited empathy:
“[T]his may be because we evolved in an environment in which we lived in
small groups and developed immediate, emotionally based intuitive
responses to the needs and transgressions of others. There was little or no
interaction with faraway strangers.” 77
Slovic and Zionts do not, however, offer this “psychic numbing” as an
excuse. 78 While appeals to our empathy are necessary, they are insufficient.
Like Baron, Slovic and Zionts believe that highlighting harm to individuals
(as opposed to groups) is important to elicit the desired emotional response,
but must be done in conjunction with appeals to reason.79 Citing our
evolutionary development, they posit that while our primitive affective
responses to experiences were sufficient to deal with early dangers (e.g., is
this plant safe to eat?), as society became more complex, humans developed
analytical ways of thinking to solve more sophisticated problems. 80 In the
context of curbing genocide, they emphasize alerting society to the limits of
empathy appeals and encouraging deliberation and a moral commitment
toward protecting individuals. 81
Cognitive scientist Steven Pinker sees similar promise in the theory of
reciprocal altruism:
So what are the prospects that we can expand the circle of
sympathy outward from babies, fuzzy animals, and the people
bound to us in communal relationships, to lasso in larger and
larger sets of strangers? One set of predictions comes from the
theory of reciprocal altruism and its implementation in Tit for
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 109 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 128.
Id.
They refer to these two modes of thinking as System 1 and System 2. Id. at 117-18.
Id. at 119-27.
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Tat and other strategies that are “nice” in the technical sense that
they cooperate on the first move and don’t defect until defected
upon. If people are nice to strangers in this sense, they should
have some tendency to be sympathetic to strangers, with the
ultimate (that is, evolutionary) goal of probing for the possibility
of a mutually beneficial relationship. Sympathy should be
particularly likely to spring into action when an opportunity
presents itself to confer a large benefit to another person at a
relatively small cost to oneself, that is, when we come across a
person in need. It should also be fired up where there are
common interests that grease the skids toward a mutually
beneficial relationship, such as having similar values and
belonging to a common coalition. 82
Now, if the fight against genocide has been difficult, one might conclude
that the prospects for robust immigrant rights reform seem dim,
notwithstanding the suggested interventions of psychologists to lessen the
effects of parochialism and increase empathy for the individual. Still, the
practical experiences of former Amnesty International Director William
Schulz suggest that empathy, though insufficient, may have its place in the
contemporary debate over immigrant rights, the same struggle Field
grappled with in his Chae and Fong opinions. 83 Citing philosopher Richard
Rorty, Schulz observes:
[A]s the philosopher Richard Rorty pointed out, parochialism—
at least in the sense of caring first and most for the welfare of
those who are most like us—may well be the starting point for a
robust commitment to human rights. It is almost impossible, in
Rorty’s view, to identify with the abstraction called “humanity.”
We first identify with those who are most like us and then,
through hearing stories and learning of the travails of others
outside our group, gradually “see more and more traditional
differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs and the like) as
unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to
pain and humiliation—the ability to think of people widely
different from ourselves as included in the range of us.” I
emphasize this point because I have seen so many people come
82. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED 581-82 (2011).
83. William F. Schulz, The Difference It Makes, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION,
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 298, 305 (internal citation omitted).
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to the human rights movement—first because they cared
foremost about Ethiopians or Uighurs or women or lesbian and
gay people, often because they themselves fell into one of those
categories, but who then came to extend their caring to others
whose rights were being denied. 84
In Schulz’s words, I sense optimism borne of experience. Just as Pinker
suggests that altruistic acts toward a stranger may engender empathy in the
giver, Schulz reminds us that even acts of empathy toward in-group
members may eventually lead to empathy toward outsiders. Similarly,
Justice Field was no progressive with respect to either immigration policy
or race relations, yet he appeared to guard against the parochialism evident
in his Chae opinion to recognize the equal dignity of all persons—even
outsiders—outlined in his Fong dissent.

84. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/8

